Job retention and advancement in employment : review of research evidence by Johnson, Anthony
JOB RETENTION AND ADVANCEMENT IN





    7962 8557
JOB RETENTION AND ADVANCEMENT IN
EMPLOYMENT: REVIEW OF RESEARCH EVIDENCE
A study carried out by the




4Ó Crown copyright 2002. Published with permission of
the Department for Work and Pensions on behalf of
the Controller of Her Majesty’s Stationary Office.
The text in this report (excluding the Royal Arms and Departmental
logos) may be reproduced free of charge in any format or medium
provided that it is reproduced accurately and not used in a misleading
context.  The material must be acknowledged as Crown copyright and
the title of the report specified.  The DWP would appreciate receiving
copies of any publication that includes material taken from this report.
Any queries relating to the content of this report and copies of
publications that include material from this report should be sent to:
Paul Noakes, Social Research Branch, Room 4-26 Adelphi, 1-11 John
Adam Street, London WC2N 6HT
For information about Crown copyright you should visit the Her
Majesty’s Stationery Office (HMSO) website at: www.hmsogov.uk
First Published 2002
ISBN  185197 985 9
ISSN  1368 244X
Acknowledgements
A large number of analysts from across the Department of Work and Pensions and the
Employment Service have supplied data and research reports for this review.  Special




2. Research questions and scope of the review 3
3. Terminology 5
4. Benefit-leavers vulnerable to job loss 7
5. Problems faced by benefit-leavers in retaining jobs 15
6. Job retention and advancement programmes: overview 19
7. Job retention programmes: stand-alone post-employment programmes 21
8. Job retention programmes: the role of financial support programmes 23
9. Job retention programmes: post-employment services forming part
of pre-employment programmes 29
10. Conclusions: bringing the evidence together 41
Tables
Table 1.  The impact of selected demographic and social factors on 
benefit-leavers returning to JSA 47
Table 2.  Benefit-leavers returning to JSA from NDYP 48
Table 3.  The impact of benefit history and return-to-work job on those
returning to JSA 49
Table 4.  Lone parents: exits from work 50
Table 5.  Movement in and out of work of lone parents: individuals and
households 51
Table 6.  Initial activity of Incapacity Benefit claimants after leaving IB and
activity at time of postal follow-up, 12 to 18 months later. 51
Table 7.  Activity of Incapacity Benefit claimants prior to IB claim 52
Table 8. Reasons for JSA claimants leaving a job within 3 months. 52
Table 9.  Health impairments of Incapacity Benefit Claimants at start of claim 53
Table 10.  How paid work was affected by health on leaving IB 53
Table 11.  Main work-related reasons for lone parents returning to claim
Income Support 54
Table 12.  Potential barriers to employment among US welfare recipients
and the US population 54
Table 13.  Estimated impact of EITC, California Work Pays Demonstration




1.1 The Department of Work & Pensions was asked by the Centre for Management and
Policy Studies (CMPS) in June 2001 to conduct a review of research evidence and
administrative data relating to the retention and advancement in employment of
those groups with a tendency toward benefit dependence.  CMPS required the
review in order to feed the evidence into the design phase of the Employment,
Retention and Advancement Demonstration (ERAD) project which is being
developed at the Cabinet Office.
1.2 Given the urgency of the request, the following report has been prepared to provide
an overview of:
• the main characteristics of benefit-leavers, the jobs they enter, and the
problems they encounter in staying and advancing in work;
• policies that are known to improve job retention and advancement rates, both
here in the UK and North America.
1.3 It should be stressed that this report is not intended to be a comprehensive review of
research evidence on job retention and advancement issues1.  To that end, DWP
has commissioned the Centre for Research in Social Policy (CRSP) at
Loughborough University to conduct an international review of ‘in-work support
programmes for long term unemployed workers’.  Their report will provide a
systematic analysis of job retention and advancement policies in OECD countries
and will be available Spring 2002.
                                                
1  The review of labour market administrative data for the UK is available as a separate report.
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32. Research questions and scope of the review
2.1 The review considers three research questions:
2.1.1 which groups are particularly vulnerable to movement between work and out-of-
work benefits and back again and why?
2.1.2 what are the barriers to retaining work these groups face?
2.1.3 what types of policies or interventions might help out-of-work benefit-leavers
retain work and help them advance?
2.2 It should be noted that two further research questions were posed by CMPS
relating to the kind of jobs benefit-leavers enter and problems faced by benefit
leavers in job advancement.  There was very little evidence available on these
issues and most of the research material relating to these questions has been
omitted from this version of the report.
2.3 The research evidence gathered for this review comes from two main sources:
• DWP, ES and DfES evaluation reports of post-employment services
which form part of UK Government labour market programmes.  DWP
reports of administrative data analyses were also used for the report;
• US reviews of labour market programmes in North America which have
incorporated some element of job retention and job advancement into
their strategies.
2.4 The report focuses on the following UK labour market programmes:
• Earnings Top-up
• Family Credit
• New Deal for Disabled People: Personal Adviser Service and Innovative
Schemes pilots
• New Deal for Lone Parents: Personal Adviser Service and Innovative
Schemes pilots
• Employment Zones
2.5 Given the limited UK evidence on job retention and advancement issues,
evidence has been used from North America to ‘fill in the gaps’ of our
knowledge and to provide a framework for the discussion of policy issues.
Purpose designed job retention and advancement programmes have been
operating in the United States and Canada for more than twenty years and
these two countries provide a rich source of evidence as to ‘what works’ and
4what does not.  However, it is important to bear in mind when evaluating the US
evidence, that labour market conditions and welfare-to-work programmes
operate in a very different policy and legal framework.  Care should be taken in
generalizing the US evidence to the UK labour market.
53. Terminology
3.1 The report makes use of a number of terms that are similar and often used
interchangeably.  To facilitate matters, a number of key terms are defined
below.
3.1.1 Job retention: Kellard et.al. (2001) suggest the term relates to “employees who
remain in their job when their own circumstances change or when the job itself
changes” - this is crucial if the change puts the worker under some kind of
stress.  The term has a rather different meaning from an employer’s
perspective.
3.1.2 Job stability: a similar term to ‘job retention’ relating to whether an individual
maintains employment on a continuing basis.  It is usually measured in terms of
how long a job lasts (there is some ambiguity as to whether it means retaining a
specific job or a succession of jobs with continuous employment).  Strawn &
Martinson (2001) use the term ‘steady work’ to mean job stability: ensuring that
low income workers stay in the workforce over time - as opposed to helping
workers retain a particular job (which may keep them in low pay).
3.1.3 Job advancement: Strawn & Martinson (2001) define advancement as ‘better
jobs’, i.e. jobs with higher pay, better benefits and conditions of service, regular
hours, and/or, full-time status.
3.1.4 Employability: relating to a worker “having the capability to gain initial
employment, maintain employment and obtain new employment if required,”
Hillage & Pollard (1998) quoted in Kellard et.al. (2001).
3.1.5 Employment sustainability: defined by Kellard et.al. (2001) as “the maintenance
of a stable or upward employment trajectory in the long term.  Sustainability will
be determined by personal characteristics and circumstances and by labour
market opportunities.”  It should be noted that this term embraces the notion of
job retention and advancement.
3.1.6 Pre-employment services: a range of measures that aim to prepare a benefit
claimant for work and to help place the claimant into work.
3.1.7 Post-employment services: a range of measures to help benefit-leavers
maintain employment once they have obtained a job.
3.1.8 In-work support services: post-employment support services (sometimes
referred to as ‘after-care’).  There is some ambiguity as to whether the term
means services ‘in the workplace’ or simply ‘services which maintain an
individual in work’.
63.1.9 Supported work: defined by Brown (2001: 38) as “job experience in real-world
employment settings as a transitional step to permanent employment”.
Supported work is usually provided by private sector companies that have been
specifically established to help the long term unemployed, for example the Wise
Group in Glasgow and Newham.  It should be noted that in the UK, companies
such as Wise are considered to be part of the Intermediate Labour Market
(ILM).
3.1.10 Transitional benefits: income (wage) supplements that are available to benefit
claimants when they obtain a job.  They may consist of direct payments, e.g. for
transportation costs, or indirect payments through a tax credit.  They are
normally time-limited and/or limited by income gains.
3.1.11 Income (wage) supplements: see transitional benefits.
3.2 To avoid confusion, the term ‘welfare recipient’ is used throughout the report to
refer to individuals receiving US Federal or State benefits.  The term ‘benefit
claimant’ is used to refer to individuals receiving UK Government-funded
benefits.
3.3 There is no straightforward term available to refer to individuals who are former
benefit claimants and who are now in work.  As a compromise, they are
referred to as ‘benefit-leavers’ in this report.
74. Benefit-leavers vulnerable to job loss
Research question: Which groups are particularly vulnerable to movement
between work and out-of-work benefits and back again and why?
4.1 Data availability in UK
There are three recent studies of survey and administrative data available
relating to JSA claimants:
• Ashworth, K. & Liu, W.C. (2001): This is a study of 2,436 benefit leavers
who returned to JSA within a one month or three month period.  For the
purposes of the current report, the analysis only refers to those leaving
over the three month period.  These data relate to 562 JSA benefit-
leavers with permanent jobs and 525 leavers with temporary jobs.
• Stickland, (2001) and Stickland & Macnair (2001): both provide an up-
to-date analysis of New Deal administrative data.
4.2 DWP is currently considering undertaking a detailed analysis of the Survey of
Families with Children (SOLIF) to investigate patterns of movement of lone
parents between work and benefit.  If undertaken, the analysis would be
available in 2002.  A limited analysis of the database is reported below in
section 4.10 onwards based on Marsh (2001b).
4.3 Overall rates of return
According to Sweeney (1996), one quarter (27%) of claimants who leave
unemployment to obtain a job return to claim unemployment benefits within 13
weeks, whilst two out of five (40%) return within six months.  More recent data
from Ashworth & Liu (2001) indicate that rates vary considerably according to
whether jobs are permanent or temporary: they found that 12% of benefit-
leavers who obtain a permanent job return to JSA within 3 months compared to
over one third (38%) of benefit-leavers who obtain a temporary job and return to
JSA within 3 months (see table 1).  Analysis of NDYP data shows that 24% of
young adults placed into subsidised jobs through New Deal come back onto
JSA within 13 weeks2, although a smaller proportion of workers over 25 years
of age (18%) return after the same period of time.  After six months, Sweeney
(1996) reports that the chances of a person remaining in work improve
considerably.
                                                
2  The most recent data for June 2001 indicate that the rate may be improving: 22% NDYP jobs lasted less
than 13 weeks (DWP Labour Market Factsheet, Sept 2001).
84.4 Personal characteristics
Gender is a significant determinant of whether a former claimant will leave a job
within 3 months and return to JSA.
• Men are more likely than women to leave a job within 3 months and
return to JSA: 14% of men leave a permanent job within 3 months
compared to 8% of women (see table 1).  Stickland (2001) reports 47%
of male benefit-leavers return to JSA within a year compared to 30% of
females (see table 2).
• However, it should be noted that there is a greater likelihood of women
leaving work to claim other non-JSA benefits, or becoming the
dependent partner of somebody in work or claiming benefits.  Thus, it
cannot be assumed that women have a greater job retention rate on the
basis of JSA data alone.
The significance of age is less clear:
• Older workers (aged over 55 years) and those aged 25 to 34 years are
more likely to make an early return to JSA from a permanent job
compared to other age groups (see table 1).  NDYP data shows that
those aged 18 years are more likely to return to JSA within one year
compared to 24 year olds (see table 2)
• However, Ashworth & Liu (2001) report that age does not appear to be a
statistically significant determinant of early returns to JSA (they only
found a limited association between age group 25-34 years (P<.05) and
those leaving permanent jobs within one month).
4.5 According to Ashworth & Liu (2001) workers in a permanent job with health
problems are twice as likely as those without health problems to return to JSA
within 3 months (the differences are less significant for temporary workers).
• However, poor health and disability are not necessarily directly related to
return to JSA: the NDYP data suggest that there is little difference
between able young adults and those with disabilities in their rates of
return to JSA (Stickland 2001).
• The situation is further complicated by the fact that benefit-leavers may
quit their job to claim other non-JSA benefits such as Incapacity Benefit.
4.6 Ethnicity does not appear to be a significant factor in relation to rates for return
to JSA (Ashworth & Liu, 2001).
4.7 Personal relationships
9Workers without a partner or spouse are slightly more likely to return to JSA
within 3 months of obtaining a job.  Whether they have children does not appear
to make a significant difference (see table 1).  However, further multiple
regression analysis by Ashworth & Liu has shown that children aged over 5
years in a relationship is a significant determinant of whether a benefit-leaver
will exit from permanent employment within three months.
4.8 Personal skills
There is a strong association between early return to JSA and those lacking
qualifications.
• Former JSA claimants lacking qualifications or with only vocational
qualifications are nearly twice as likely to return to JSA within three
months of obtaining a permanent job compared to those with both
academic and vocational qualifications (see table 1).
• For those leaving NDYP, 50% without qualifications return to JSA within
a year whilst only 27% with NVQ4 or higher return to JSA within a year
(see table 2).
4.9 Journey to work
There is a strong association between early returns to JSA of benefit-leavers
and those who have difficulty getting to work (see table 1).
• Benefit-leavers without a driving licence, without access to private
transport or with a long journey time to work are much more likely to
return to JSA within three months of obtaining a permanent or temporary
job.
4.10 Housing tenure
Ashworth & Liu (2001) found that housing tenure is associated with early exits
of benefit-leavers from a permanent job (see table 1).
• 21% of benefit-leavers living in social rented accommodation and 14%
of those living with others left a permanent job within three months
compared to 8% of benefit leavers in owner-occupied accommodation
and 7% in private rented accommodation.
4.11 Employment record
A strong determinant of whether a former JSA claimant will leave a job to return
to JSA is their previous history as a JSA claimant: those who have had recent,
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long spells as claimants or have had three or more spells as claimants are
much more likely to leave a job and make an early return to JSA3.
• Workers whose most recent spell on JSA was 27 weeks or more are
five times more likely to return to JSA within 3 months of obtaining a
permanent job than those whose most recent JSA spell was 13 weeks
or less (47% return within 3 months of obtaining a job against 10%) (see
table 3).
• The proportion of workers making early returns to JSA is higher for those
accepting temporary jobs, but the claimant’s JSA history makes less of
an impact (see table 3).
• Length of spells: workers who have had three or more previous spells on
JSA are three times more likely to return to JSA within 3 months of
obtaining a permanent job compared to those who have not had a
previous spell (28% against 9%) (see table 3).  The NDYP data gives a
similar picture: 19% with one prior JSA claim return to JSA within one
year against 83% of those with nine or more prior JSA claims (see table
2).
4.12 Data on the experiences of lone parents
A preliminary analysis has been undertaken by Alan Marsh (at PSI) of the lone
parents cohort of the PRILIF4 database comparing the employment
experiences of lone parents in 1991 against those for 1998 (see tables 4 & 5).
Percentages of lone parents who have made at least one exit from work
between 1991 and 1998 is used as an indicator of job stability.
4.13 Lone parents’ exits from work
For those in work in 1991, table 4 shows that the percentage who have made at
least one exit from work is highest for:
• mothers who have never partnered - 39%, compared to 25% for
widowed mothers;
• lone parents in private renting - 50%, compared to 28% for owner
occupiers;
• White lone parents - 33%, compared to 23% for Black and Asian;
• lone parents with no qualifications - 40%, compared to 22% for those
with higher qualifications;
                                                
3   However, Ashworth & Liu note that the relationship between previous work history and early return to JSA is
not straightforward: it is not always the case that people with work experience are less likely to return
compared to those with no recent job experience.
4 Programme of Research into Low-Income Families.
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• lone parents who received Income Support in 1991 - 56%, compared to
31% who were not receiving IS in 1991.
4.14 The relationship between job stability and number of dependent children is
more complex.  Table 4 shows that:
• only 18% of those without dependent children in 1991 have made an exit
from work compared to 39% for those with three or more children;
• however, the proportion exiting work with only one child (36%) is higher
than those with two children (26%).
4.15 Lone parents: movement in and out of work
Table 5 shows that the employment status of a lone parent in 1991 has a strong
association with their employment status in 1998:
• More than three quarters of lone parents working full-time (24 hours plus)
in 1991 were working full-time in 1998 (only 11% were out of work).
• Only one fifth of those out of work in 1991 were working full-time in 1998.
Over half (58%) were still unemployed in 1998.
4.16 In addition, findings from the PRILIF database indicate a common pattern of
lone parents moving out of work and back to benefits during the summer
months when their children are off school and then moving back to work after
the summer (often to the same employer).  Marsh (2001b) has shown that lone
parents will move into employment on their accord “when they are ready to do
so” and that once they move into work, they tend to stay in work.
4.17 According to Marsh (2001b), other things being equal, the main determinant of
whether a lone parent is currently working is what she was doing when she
became a lone parent.  “Higher rates of exit are associated with the familiar
barriers to entry: poor health and young children.”
4.18 Incapacity Benefit claimants
Data on Incapacity Benefit (IB) claimants who leave Benefit is available from a
survey conducted by Dorsett et.al. (1998).  They found that 62% of IB claimants
are male, claimants are to be found in all age groups, but with the greatest
proportion (31%) aged 46 to 55 years.  Two thirds (64%) do not have
dependent children, just over half (55%) are owner occupiers and just under two
thirds (62%) have no qualifications.
4.19 The experience of IB claimants when they leave benefits differs from JSA
claimants and lone parents in a number of important respects (see table 6).
Dorsett et.al. (1998) showed that:
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• Four out of five (79%) IB claimants who were working after leaving
benefit voluntarily were still working 12 to 18 months later (postal survey
data).  Only 4% had subsequently become unemployed, although 14%
were once again sick;
• Just over half (56%) of those who were unemployed when leaving IB
voluntarily had subsequently found employment; only 15% were still
unemployed.
4.20 Part of the success of former IB claimant’s employment record can be
explained by the fact they return to a former job.  However, not all IB claimants
return to (or want to return to) their former job (assuming they were working
when starting an IB claim).  Dorsett et.al. (1998) do not explore the relationship
between job history and subsequent work experience on leaving IB.  However,
there is some evidence that the two are linked: three quarters of their sample
had been employed before claiming IB (see table 7) and three quarters of the
same sample took up employment when first leaving IB (see table 6).  The data
do not allow us to relate individuals across the two tables, but the data suggest
that, like lone parents and JSA claimants, prior job history has an influence on
the ability of an individual to obtain and retain employment.
4.21 Occupational status of job leavers returning to JSA
There is a limited amount of information from published sources on the
occupational status of JSA claimants who leave a job after securing
employment5.  Data from the Ashworth & Liu (2001) study (see table 3) show
that:
• blue collar workers are up to four times more likely to leave within 3
months of obtaining a permanent job compared to white collar workers.
The highest rates of return to JSA are for unskilled manual workers
(other occupations): 22% return within 3 months compared to 1% of
professional / associate / and technical workers (see table 3);
• rates of return to JSA for temporary workers are significantly higher than
for permanent workers (partly as a consequence of the temporary nature
of the job);
• however, differences in rates of return to JSA between blue and white
collar workers with temporary jobs are much less significant: 51% of
unskilled manual workers (other occupations) return within 3 months
compared to 38% of professional / associate / and technical workers.
                                                
5 Detailed information on jobs obtained by benefit-leavers (and the jobs they subsequently leave) can be
obtained from the Labour Force Survey (LFS) team at DFES.  Information on the job history of benefit-leavers
over a three month or 12 month period is available through a special tabulation of LFS data.   Further
information on this issue may be obtainable from ONS based on their own analysis of longitudinal LFS
datasets (constructed for a limited number of households, approx 8,000).
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5. Problems faced by benefit-leavers in retaining jobs
Research question:  What are the barriers to retaining work these groups face?
5.1 There is a limited amount of UK evidence on ‘barriers’ faced by benefit-leavers
in retaining work.  A number of findings for JSA claimants, Incapacity Benefit
claimants and lone parents are reported below.
5.2 JSA claimants
Ashworth & Liu (2001) found in their study that just over half (53%) of workers
returned to JSA within 3 months of taking a permanent job either because they
resigned or were sacked (see table 8).  These statistics do not provide further
insight into their reasons for leaving, but it would be fair to say that over half of
workers in permanent jobs left because they were unhappy with the job (40%)
or their employer was unhappy with their work (13%).  A further 14% were made
redundant, and 9% of workers left for health, family or personal reasons.
5.3 Amongst temporary workers, three quarters stayed the course and left when the
job ended or expired.  However, Ashworth & Liu still found that 15% of
temporary workers resigned or were sacked before the temporary job ran its full
course (i.e. within 3 months of starting).
5.4 Incapacity Benefit claimants
Data on the barriers faced by IB claimants in retaining work are not available
directly, but data on health impairments can be inferred from the Dorsett et.al.
(1998) survey returns:
• nearly half of IB claimants (47%) were suffering from musculo-skeletal
problems (particularly to the back and neck) at the start of the IB claim;
16% were suffering from cardio-vascular problems (breathing, heart,
blood pressure) and 18% from mental problems, especially depression6
(see table 9);
5.5 It is not clear how many were free of these health impairments on returning to
work, but of those reporting continuing sickness or disability on leaving IB, the
major problems were:
• difficulty with heavy physical work (76%), taking time off for sickness or
for treatment (63%), and restrictions on the number of hours they could
work (61%), (see table 10).
5.6 Lone parents
                                                
6 Research and Evaluation Division have commented that other research indicates much higher levels of
mental problems amongst IB claimants.  Please refer to Jobcentre Plus for further information.
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Hales et.al. (2000) study of lone parents participating in the prototype NDLP
areas found three main reasons for lone parents leaving work and returning to
Income Support: 40% left for their own reasons, 21% lost their job, and 12%
quoted a breakdown in a personal relationship (see table 11).
5.7 A small-scale qualitative survey of forty lone parents by Lewis (2001) as a
follow-up to the NDLP prototype evaluation throws some light on these findings.
Factors that emerged from this study affecting employment sustainability were:
• suitability of job –  getting the right job was important.  Lone parents
were likely to stop working if the job was too demanding, if they didn’t
enjoy the job or it had no prospects.  Some lone parents had high
expectations of work and were disappointed when the job did not work
out as expected.  Others wanted a job but were not clear what kind of job
they wanted and often accepted the ‘wrong’ type of job;
• employer practices – lone parents were less likely to sustain their job if
employers did not stick to the agreed hours and asked lone parents to
work longer and if they were generally inflexible as to their needs;
• working environment – lone parents were not likely to stay in a job if
managers and/or colleagues were perceived as ‘hostile’;
• financial transition – managing until the first pay cheque arrived and
coping with unexpected costs influenced whether lone parents stayed  in
employment;
• childcare – changes in availability and costs, and how children
responded to childcare affected whether lone parents stayed in their
jobs.
5.8 ‘Barriers’ to retaining jobs: general issues
Marsh (2001b) comments that the reasons lone parents exit work are much the
same as the problems (barriers) they experience in gaining work (see 4.15
above).  However, the term ‘barrier’ in the context of finding or retaining work is
somewhat misleading, although it is difficult to find a more satisfactory
alternative.  The term is normally used to refer to a problem that has to be in
some sense ‘overcome’ to allow a claimant to obtain a job.  In real terms, a
benefit claimant may find a way of coping with a ‘barrier’ to obtain a job, but
this does not mean that a barrier has been overcome, per se.  For example,
someone with a drug problem, learning problem, disability etc. may well still
suffer from this ‘barrier’ when they obtain work and the ‘barrier’ may re-emerge
as a problem for retaining employment at a later date.  In the context of job
retention, it may be more meaningful to talk of ‘triggers’ or ‘stressors’ that cause
an individual to leave a job and return to benefits.
16
5.9 Brown (2001) points out that ‘barriers’ vary enormously in terms of severity and
the ease with which they may be overcome or coped with.  She provides US
data on the prevalence of specific problems that may constitute ‘barriers’ to
employment (see table 12).  For example, she quotes the percentage of welfare
recipients with a criminal record as 46% against the US population as 5%: a
rate nine times higher than the US population.
5.10 It is notable that all the ‘barriers’ listed by Brown may persist into employment
and may not necessarily form a barrier, per se, to performing work.  At a later
stage, they may also constitute a reason for leaving work: for example, a worker
with a drug problem may have ‘contained’ the problem sufficiently well to allow a
them to obtain a job, but a relapse may act as the ‘trigger’ which leads to
dismissal.
5.11 Discussion in the US literature on this issue suggests we can group the kinds of
problems faced by former benefit claimants in retaining work as follows:
• pre-existing ‘barriers’ that re-emerge as significant factors in retaining
work, e.g. long standing illness;
• new problems that arise in work (e.g. getting into arguments with
supervisors, or failure of an employer to honour agreements on hours);
• new problems that arise in private life.  Many problems may be short-
term crises, e.g. loss of accommodation, relationship break down,
failure of childcare arrangements.
5.12 These categories are not entirely satisfactory since they are not mutually
exclusive: a problem that a lone parent may have with childcare may be a
‘barrier’ to obtaining work, but it may re-emerge as a problem in work and
constitute a short-term crisis as the parent tries to find an alternative means for
looking after the child.
5.13 Obtaining accurate information on ‘barriers’ or ‘triggers’ to losing jobs is
problematic: table 12 reveals a wide variation in prevalence rates of problems
for US welfare recipients.  This variation is highly significant: Brown points out
that it is extraordinarily difficult to obtain information on such ‘barriers’ to
employment because welfare recipients actively seek to conceal them from
employment service staff.  The only likely exception to this is a person’s criminal
past which is a matter of public record.  Once a person has obtained a job there
is an even greater incentive to hide such sensitive information from an employer
for fear of stigmatization or fear of losing a job.  It points to a very real problem
for employment service staff seeking to promote a benefit-leaver’s career as
part of a job retention / advancement programme.
17
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6. Job retention and advancement programmes: overview
Research question:  What types of policies or interventions might help out-of-
work benefit-leavers retain work and help them advance?
6.1 Job retention and advancement programmes can be grouped into four
categories:
• stand-alone programmes that focus exclusively on the provision of post-
employment services;
• in-work financial support programmes;
• post-employment services that form an integral part of pre-employment
programmes;
• Intermediate Labour Market (ILM) programmes, known in the US as
‘supported work’ programmes.  These programmes are only discussed
in passing in this report.  More will be forthcoming on the work of ILMs in
the CRSP review of In-work support programmes for LTU available
early in 2002.
6.2 In the following sections, each of the above types of job retention and
advancement programmes will be reviewed in turn.  In each case, the North
American evidence will be reviewed first in order to provide a policy framework




7 Job retention programmes: Stand-alone, post-employment
programmes
7.1 United States experience
The Post Employment Services Demonstration (PESD) study is the best known
example of a stand-alone, job retention programme in the United States.
PESD was a two year randomized control trial which was designed to provide
post-employment services to low-paid workers.  It operated between 1994 and
1996 in four cities of the United States: Chicago, Illinois; Riverside, California;
Portland, Oregon; and, San Antonio, Texas.
7.2 The main focus of PESD was the provision of case-management services to
welfare recipients who had already found a job.  Case managers were
employed within welfare agencies to contact potential clients (parents with
children) and provide them with counselling and support (to retain, and advance
in, their jobs), job search assistance, help with resolving benefit issues
(including Medicaid, childcare) and referrals to agencies to deal with, for
example, childcare, health issues, skills training and legal aid.  They were also
able to provide small, occasional payments to clients to help with work-related
expenses.
7.3 According to Strawn & Martinson (2001), the PESD evaluation showed that
participants did not keep their jobs any longer, or earn any more, than the
control group in any of the cities, although there were some variations between
cities on use of cash assistance and Food Stamp receipts.  These findings are
consistent with a similar project, the Denver Work Incentive Program (DWIP),
staged in the early 1980s which also failed to produce positive outcomes (see
Strawn & Martinson 2001).
7.4 There were a number of factors which could explain the negative results, for
example, lack of staff experience, failure to provide appropriate services, but
according to Strawn & Martinson the most notable factors were:
• take-up of the programme was limited: managers encountered
difficulties in recruiting welfare recipients once they had entered work;
• once welfare recipients had been recruited, case managers struggled to
cope with their workloads and provide an effective service to clients;
• welfare recipients frequently concealed their welfare history (and other
problems) from their employer.  As a consequence, case managers
often found it difficult to work with employers because of the client’s fear
of being stigmatized and losing their jobs.
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7.5 The GAPS Employment Retention Initiative in the mid to late 1990s had more
successful outcomes.  In this two year project, women were provided with help
for emergency childcare, financial assistance, job search, and job advancement
services.  80% of participants stayed continuously employed throughout a 6
month evaluation period.  Interestingly, in this initiative, case management was
provided by community-based, voluntary groups (reported in Kellard et.al.
2001:39)7.
7.6 United Kingdom experience
There are no general, labour-market programmes of this type known to be
operating in the United Kingdom.  Four NDDP Innovative Pilot schemes were
designed to provide exclusive job retention services for disabled people but
detailed information on their impact is not available (see 9.27 below).
                                                
7  However, a recent evaluation of the similar Community Solutions job retention programme in Pennsylvania
report relatively poor results: only 11% of those placed into full-time jobs retained a job after 12 months.
Paulsell, D. & Stieglitz, A. (2001) Implementing employment retention services in Pennsylvania: lessons from
Community Solutions, Mathematica, Princeton NJ.
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8. Job retention programmes: the role of financial support
programmes
8.1 In-work State and Federal financial benefits for low paid workers have existed
in the United States since the 1970s.  The best known benefit is the Earned
Income Tax Credit (EITC) which is similar in character to the Working Families
Tax Credit (WFTC) in the UK.   Two financial benefits were administered in the
UK before WFTC during the 1990s, Earnings Top-up (ETU) and Family Credit,
and these are reviewed below.
8.2 The main purpose of in-work financial benefits for the low paid (variously known
as wage supplements, transitional benefits) are as inducements to work, to help
increase income, and to smooth out financial difficulties during periods of
hardship – and thus help workers retain their jobs.  Strawn & Martinson (2001)
suggest that wage supplements can also help with job advancement.
8.3 Evidence from the United States
The US evidence on financial work incentives mainly relates to working parents
with children who are former welfare recipients.  Strawn and Martinson (2001)
have summarized the findings, thus:
• most parents earn low wages, and wages increase little despite years of
work.  Despite small wage increases, earnings rise significantly over
time, as low income parents work more hours (rather than advance in
work);
• most parents work anti-social hours and/or schedules that change
frequently;
• as a result of part-time work and intermittent work at low wage jobs,
many women remain poor or near poor, even five years after leaving
welfare;
• rigorous research on wage supplements for welfare recipients shows
that wage supplements can increase employment and earnings.  They
are also an effective way to make families better off financially.
8.4 In a similar, recent review, Michalopoulos & Berlin (2001) concluded that:
• the more generous the financial incentive, the more it encourages work;
• effectiveness is increased when combined with other pre- and post-
employment policies;
• financial incentives may be necessary to increase income because
simple mandates to work can increase work but not always increase
income;
• financial work incentives can promote stable employment.
23
8.5 A distinction needs to be made between payments that may be available
through, for example, the tax system and those that are available, perhaps on a
one-off basis, to pay for day-to-day expenditures.  The first are designed to
encourage people into work and hold them there; the second are designed
primarily to deal with emergencies, such as problems with childcare or
transportation, or periods of hardship.  Of, course, these payments are also
designed to help job retention.  However, Michalopoulos & Berlin point out that
general, financial incentives can be used to deal with crises if they are available
on a regular basis.  They quote evidence from the Self Sufficiency Project
(SSP), Canada, and Minnesota Family Investment Program (MFIP) which
shows that regular monthly payments allow welfare recipients to plan ahead to
deal with ‘crises’.  These supplementary payments appear to work to
encourage welfare recipients to keep their jobs or to find new ones.
8.6 The Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC)
EITC has existed in some form or other in the USA since 1975.  Over the years
it has steadily become more generous as the impact of tax credits on
employment take-up and job retention amongst the low paid has become better
understood.  In 1999, for example, EITC provided a tax refund of up to 40% of
income to low-income taxpayers with two or more children8.
8.7 Several studies have found a positive relationship between EITC and increased
employment.  A recent analysis conducted by Hotz and his co-workers (2001)
examined AFDC9 employment data for four counties taking part in the
California Work Pays Demonstration Programme (CWPDP).  Their analysis
separated out the effects of EITC, the CWPDP (which includes a mix of pre-
and post-employment measures) and the growth of the local economy (see
table 13).
8.8 In general terms, they found that:
• local economic growth explained the greatest proportion of employment
change for AFDC parents (39% to 68% of change); EITC had an effect
of between 15% to 45% on employment change and the CWPDP had
the smallest effect of between 11% to 23%.
• EITC had a greater impact on employment growth for parents with two or
more children compared to those with one child.
                                                
8  In 1999, tax payers with two or more children could receive an EITC of 40% of income up to $9,450 (a
maximum credit of $3,816).  Those with earnings between $9,450 and $12,460 receive the maximum credit.
Thereafter the credit is reduced by 21% of earnings to a limit of $30,585 when the credit is phased out.
Workers with one child can receive a maximum credit of 34% of earnings up to $12,460 (phasing out at
$26,928); childless taxpayers can receive a much lower credit of 7.65% of earnings up to $5,670 (phasing out
at $10,200).
9 Aid to Families with Dependent Children, now replaced by Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF).
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8.9 Overall, the evidence from the United States suggests that financial incentives
may have a greater impact on employment and job retention than all other types
of pre- and post- employment measures.
8.10 Evidence from the United Kingdom
In the following sections, a review is made of Earnings Top-up and Family
Credit programmes followed by a summary of more recent measures
incorporated into New Deal programmes.
8.11 Earnings Top-up (ETU)
ETU was introduced in October 1996 as a three-year pilot programme.
Individuals and couples without dependent children were offered a wage
subsidy if they were taking up, or currently in, very low paid work.  A subsidy of
£20 to £30 was provided for individuals and £35 to £45 to couples.  Two
variants of the scheme were piloted with ETU available for different income
levels.  More than four out of five of recipients were single (of which half were
under 24 years, often living with their parents), 14% were couples, usually over
40 years old and home owners.
8.12 The ETU evaluation consisted of a series of surveys of low-paid workers in
work (recipients were compared against eligible non-recipients), unemployed
(potential recipients) and employers (see Marsh 2001a, Marsh et.al. 2001).
Multivariate analysis of a dataset of 1,019 respondents (1,065 weighted)
showed that ETU did not have a significant, overall effect on job retention.
There was some evidence that it encouraged older workers to remain in work
longer though the evidence is equivocal.  However, the qualitative research
showed that recipients found ETU helpful in allowing them to obtain the work
they wanted and keeping them in work during a period of hardship.
8.13 There was no evidence that ETU helped worker advancement: recipients did
not experience wage growth whilst receiving ETU.  There is some evidence that
employers used ETU to reduce wage rates amongst new, low-paid recruits.
There was also a high deadweight cost: most of the expenditure on ETU went
to people who would have stayed in their jobs, worked the hours they worked
and worked for the wages that were on offer without ETU.  Many recipients said
that whilst they found ETU helpful, they would have stayed on in their job even if
it had not been available.
8.14 Family Credit
Family Credit ran from 1988, following the 'Fowler' reform of social security,
until it was superseded by WFTC in October 1999.  It was designed to improve
the position of families in work beyond their position on out-of-work benefits
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and to act as an incentive for families to remain in employment.  It was available
to both lone parents and couples families.  The minimum qualifying hours for
Family Credit was 16 hours (when it was first introduced the minimum qualifying
hours was 24) and there was an extra incentive for those working 30 or more
hours per week. Family Credit was administered by the Department of Social
Security (now the Department for Work and Pensions) and was paid in ways
similar to other social security benefits (order books or through the banking
system).
8.15 The evaluation of the Family Credit programme was conducted by Bryson &
Marsh (1996) and mainly based on a survey of 1,002 families leaving Family
Credit in Sept. 1993 (with a six month follow-up).  The sample was nationally
representative, but the impact of Family Credit was not evaluated against a
representative control group.
8.16 Bryson & Marsh found that Family Credit had been successful in its aims of
helping families manage on low wages and obtain and/or sustain employment.
They established that it was particularly successful in targeting the poorest
families and helping them cope with periods of hardship, such as debt.
Couples found it especially useful where one had become unemployed: Family
Credit provided a supplement to the worker’s income while allowing their
partner time to find new work.
8.17 Family Credit provided an important boost to household earnings but very few
workers improved their circumstances whilst on the Credit itself.  Bryson &
Marsh found that advancement came when workers left for new and better paid
jobs.  Women workers, especially lone parents, were often worse off leaving
Family Credit even if they kept their jobs.  On the other hand, dual earners were
invariably better off, though not dramatically so.
8.18 Family Credit may have discouraged some partners, particularly women to take
on part-time employment and to delay entry into full-time work.  However,
Bryson & Marsh concluded that the disincentive effect was weak and only short
lived.  Similarly, the tapered withdrawal of benefits against new earnings did not
prove a disincentive to seeking new employment or increasing hours or work.
8.19 It appears that Family Credit was particularly helpful to lone parents both obtain
and stay in work (Bryson & Marsh, 1996).  The Working Families Tax Credit
can be expected to have a similar effect.
8.20 New Deal programmes
Several New Deal programmes have provided in-work financial support for
benefit-leavers.  In summary, these are:
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• Wage subsidies are available to participants in NDYP and ND25+ and
participants in the innovatory NDDP pilots (to June 2001);
• Tax-free Employment Credits and training grants are available to ND50+
participants.  The Credit is intended as an earnings top-up to encourage
older workers to take jobs which might not otherwise appear attractive.
• Personal Job Accounts (PJAs) are available in Employment Zones (see
11.18 below for further information).
• Under NDDP, additional costs of integrating disabled workers into the
workplace are met by the programme.
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9. Job retention programmes: Post-employment services
forming part of pre-employment programmes
9.1 Evidence from the United States:
The evidence from the United States is clear: programmes that have achieved
the highest job retention rates have incorporated post-employment services into
pre-employment programmes.  Recent evaluation of these programmes
indicate the following key findings:
• job retention rates and income advancement will be improved if welfare
recipients are placed initially into the best jobs possible;
• job retention rates will be improved if close, systematic support is
provided in the first few months of a job to deal with crises and the
transition to work;
• job retention rates will be improved if welfare recipients are encouraged
to develop a job advancement strategy, in effect, to move clients onto
their next job (and better job) as soon as possible.
9.2 It is important to note that the following research findings and best practice
recommendations are derived from US and Canadian demonstration projects
that primarily involve low income parents, more particularly lone parents on
welfare.  It is not clear whether these findings can be generalized to all
categories of welfare recipients, or the extent to which they may apply to the UK
labour market.
9.3 The research evidence on post-employment policies (within pre-employment
programmes) mainly focuses on five key issues:
• pre-employment strategy
• post-employment: the first few weeks in work (transitional phase)
• post-employment: case-management strategies
• post-employment: experience of working with employers
• post-employment: job advancement strategies
The following sections draw together research findings for each of these issues.
9.4 Pre-employment strategy
North American research, reported in Strawn & Martinson (2001), indicates
that:
• the better the initial job obtained by welfare recipients, the higher the
wages that are likely to be achieved at a later stage.  Placing individuals
into occupations with greater opportunities for advancement also helps.
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• low income parents are more likely to find better jobs and retain these
jobs if they are provided with basic skills training which equips them to
deal with the demands of the workplace, especially, so-called, ‘soft’
skills (relating to punctuality, attendance, effort, dealing with conflict).
• improving the basic skills of welfare recipients prior to starting a job is
linked to modest improvement in incomes at a later stage.  Individuals
who enter with higher levels of skills and qualifications are likely to
achieve higher wages later on.
• welfare recipients have an improved chance of finding better jobs if they
are provided with a flexible mix of services which is designed to meet
their needs - primarily job search, work-focused education, life skills and
job training - and by making job quality a central goal of job placement
services.
• helping unemployed, low-income parents to enter better jobs directly,
without additional education and training, requires strong relationships
with employers: employers need incentives, training for their supervisory
staff and workplace resources.  This is likely to mean establishing
partnerships with employers who have a commitment to equal
opportunities.
9.5 Post-employment: the first few weeks in work (transition phase)
Job retention is improved, according to Strawn & Martinson (2001) if
employment support staff (case managers):
• maintain frequent contact with welfare recipients to monitor problems as
they arise in the first few weeks of starting work.  They need to be quickly
aware of family and personal issues, i.e. anything that changes the
status quo and threatens the ability of individuals to maintain their job.
• ensure that individuals obtain all income supplements and other in-work
benefits to which they are entitled.
• ensure parents secure formal child-care support.  Non-experimental
research suggests that childcare problems contribute to job loss among
low-income workers; parents who have formal childcare arrangements
may retain jobs and work more over the long run than parents who rely
on relatives for care.
• develop a support strategy for workers which meets their personal
needs, i.e. ensure that workers have a flexible, individualised plan which
they can ‘buy into’ and ‘own’.
9.6 Post-employment: case-management strategies
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Strawn & Martinson (2001) argue strongly against the development of case-
management services as part of job retention programmes.  They claim that the
PESD projects, which made extensive use of individual case-management
systems, did not improve job retention rates: it was labour intensive, expensive
to run and managers were unable to provide an effective service.  Moreover,
not all welfare recipients required the service and those that did often required
specialist help which the case manager was unable to provide directly.
9.7 They propose that welfare recipients should be referred to specialist services
as part of a ‘brokering strategy’ and thus reduce costs.  In these proposals,
individuals are put in touch with services that are equipped to deal with their
problems.  It is vital to the success of service brokerage that partnerships are
developed with public and voluntary sector agencies, but more importantly, with
employers who are willing to participate in schemes to retain workers and
reduce staff turnover.
9.8 However, Strawn & Martinson (2001) admit that there is as yet no research
evidence available which shows that service brokerage improves job retention
rates although they claim that service brokering programmes in Washington
(WPLEX) look to be producing promising results.  Whether they are correct or
not, brokerage will not solve the problem of reaching low-income workers
unless employers and agencies are fully committed to such schemes.
9.9 Post-employment: working with employers
A great deal of discussion in the recent US literature has focused on the role of
employers in promoting job retention (Strawn & Martinson 2001, Brown 2001,
Kellard et.al. 2001).  As noted above, it is in the interests of employers to
reduce staff turnover and hence, costs.  However, it is also the case that the
kinds of entry-level jobs taken by welfare recipients are often with companies
that expect high turnover rates (which may keep wages down) and are less
interested in job retention, per se.
9.10 Much of the evidence for involving employers in job retention programmes
comes from research on the harder-to-employ.  Brown (2001) has produced a
useful account of job retention strategies for individual, disadvantaged groups.
The following summary from Brown (2001) appears to be based on a mix of
research findings, i.e. what is known to produce successful outcomes, and what
may be termed ‘current good practice’ for which research findings are not yet
available.
9.11 US evidence indicates the following:
Language barriers
• Welfare recipients with language problems should be encouraged to
obtain work first, particularly jobs in which language is not a barrier or
where another language is an asset.  ESOL instruction needs to be
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available in the workplace: the issue here is that workers will improve
their language skills more effectively if training makes use of work-
related language.  To achieve this, sympathetic employers need to be
found that have suitable jobs available.  It also helps if there are bi-lingual
supervisors in the workplace.
Low basic skills / learning disabilities
• Literacy services need to be promoted in the workplace and training
provided for workplace supervisors so that they can provide appropriate
support.  Workers with low basic skills and learning disabilities require a
clear training programme that defines explicit learning goals with which
workers can identify.
Ex-offenders
• There is a need to monitor possible substance abuse and to develop
relationships with employers to provide appropriate support services.
Depression and other mental health issues
• It is critical to obtain the co-operation of employers and provide in-work
support especially from co-workers and supervisors.
• There is a need to negotiate a post-employment service plan with the
client.  The plan should focus on workplace issues rather than skills, for
example, dealing with criticism from supervisors, relations with co-
workers, coping with work-related stress, ensuring that any medical
treatment continues, job coaching.
Physical disabilities and chronic health problems
• It is vital to obtain the co-operation of employers and agencies to work
with them in developing in-work resources and support.
Domestic violence
• Employment support staff need to monitor abuse after an individual
starts a job (research indicates that abuse may worsen initially) and
develop support networks.  Employers need to be educated to provide
flexible hours (for example to attend court, health clinics)
Substance abuse
• US research indicates that alcohol abuse does not effect employment
rates, but drug use does.  However, there is a need for staff to maintain
contact with workers to ensure that treatment regimes continue to avoid
relapse, to develop support systems (with agencies) and to promote
employment as an aid to recovery.
9.12 It is worth noting that a high proportion of these proposals are based upon
partnerships with employers and the development of in-work structures which
32
make use of peer support and the skills of supervisory staff.  This implies a
degree of openness about an individual’s problems which may conflict with their
own personal need for confidentiality and the avoidance of stigmatization.
9.13 Finally, whilst the evidence from Brown (2001) is useful, Strawn & Martinson
(2001) have noted that research findings on job retention programmes for the
harder-to-employ are not always consistent or unequivocal.  They quote some
evidence that specialised programmes, such as supported employment10, have
achieved positive outcomes by building on the job skills of workers
incrementally and by developing “employment focused counselling” to deal with
mental health and substance abuse.
9.14 Post-employment: job advancement strategies
According to Strawn & Martinson (2001), the US evidence on job advancement
strategies is emphatic: ‘advancement’ is a key component of retention
strategies and cannot be thought of as a separate and expendable component:
• Research indicates that higher incomes are more likely to be achieved
when individuals move on to their next (better) job.  As a result, Strawn &
Martinson (2001) propose that in-work support should focus on a career
advancement strategy at an early stage.  By so doing, individuals are
more likely to maintain their commitment to work and reach the point
more quickly when they are no longer dependent on income
supplements.
• For the majority of low-income parents, the ability to move into better
jobs will depend on access to effective services to improve their skills
and qualifications.  Developing partnerships with employers to create
customized entry-level training and training to improve existing skills -
offered in the workplace during work hours - looks to be the most
promising strategy for overcoming the logistical barriers for working
parents.
• Additional financial support and supportive services may be needed so
that low income parents who are working can pursue education and
training on their own.
9.15 The UK evidence
Most UK labour market intervention policies since 1997 - broadly the New Deal
programmes - have included some element of after-care services as part of
their broad remit.  In most instances, after-care has been limited in scope:
                                                
10  Known as intermediate labour market, ILM, projects in the UK.
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• New Deal Personal Advisors (NDPAs) maintain contact with most
employers and provide support to NDYP and ND25+ participants for up
to 26 weeks for those in subsidised employment11.  The evidence
suggests that this contact has been critical for keeping one in six of
NDYP participants in their job and one in ten of ND25+ participants12;
• NDPAs are available to provide in-work support for participants in EZs,
NDLP and NDDP (see below for discussion).  Support is technically
available to ONE clients working 16 or more hours per week and to
NDPU clients at the discretion of the PA.  However, there is no evidence
that support has in fact been offered13.
• A system of mentors and ‘buddies’ has been developed in some of the
NDDP innovative pilots (see 11.26 for further discussion).
• Another class of in-work support is training.  There has been a pilot In
Work Training Grant (IWTG) for NDLP participants that is currently being
evaluated.  New Deal50+ provides a training grant with slightly different
conditions (not a pilot).  Several evaluation reports have been published
which show that take-up is low, but those who have made use of the
grants have expressed positive views.
9.16 Financial support components of New Deal programmes were summarised in
section 8.20.
9.17 In the following sections, evidence from evaluation reports is used to shed
some light on in-work support policies for Employment Zones (EZs) and for lone
parents (NDLP) and disabled people (mainly through NDDP).  EZs look to be
performing well in retaining workers in jobs (at least for 13 weeks) though
evaluation evidence is currently limited.  The NDLP and NDDP programmes
are interesting because there has been considerable trialing of in-work support
systems.
9.18 Employment Zones (EZs)
Employment Zones were established in April 2000 as a fifteen-month pilot
programme (since extended) to test more radical methods for helping LTU JSA
claimants into sustainable employment.  Job seekers work with their Personal
Advisers to design a personal strategy to support them into work.  They have
access to funds through Personal Job Accounts (PJAs) to help to meet
individual needs.  PAs are expected to develop the soft skills of their clients;
                                                
11 There is another sense in which NDYP/ND25+ provide support in that clients returning to JSA within 13
weeks return to New Deal, and pick up where they left off with their PA.
12  Please refer to the Research and Evaluation Division RD1d team for detailed evidence.
13   Please refer to ASD Social Research for further evidence on ONE and Research and Evaluation RD3e
team for evidence on NDPU.
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raise morale and expectations; help the client find a job; and provide in-work
support for those who actually obtain work.
9.19 Significantly, the EZ programme makes use of private sector contractors to act
as Personal Advisors and help place LTU clients into work.  The contractors are
paid for their work in stages with the largest payment of around £2,500 after the
client has maintained employment for a minimum of 13 weeks.  To date,
evaluation research has shown that the EZ programme has been well received
by clients (CPC 2001): they feel that their views are listened to (80% are in
contact with their PA at least once a fortnight), most appreciate that they are
involved in, and ‘own’, their Action Plan and they appreciate the flexibility
afforded by the PJA.  The PJA is normally worth £400 to £600 per client,
although there have been instances where as much as £2,000 has been spent
on individuals.  It has been used to pay off debts, purchase clothes, rent cars
and help set up businesses, as well as more conventional uses such as paying
for training.
9.20 The EZ approach appears to be paying dividends: mid-term evaluation results
for April 2001 indicate that Employment Zones may be making a significant
impact on unemployment rates in the EZ pilot areas14.  Employment returns for
two more quarters (June and September 2001) are needed to confirm that the
current trend is statistically significant.  Unfortunately, evaluation reports are not
available at the time of writing which provide detailed information on the type of
post-employment activities available to support clients in work.  The Cambridge
Policy Consultants qualitative, interim report (2001) shows that PAs are
adopting a work-first policy (training concentrates on developing existing rather
than new skills) and stressing a (limited) job advancement strategy: clients are
encouraged to view their initial job as only a stepping stone to a better job.
However, early findings indicate that the ‘after-care’ element of EZ has not been
developed to any great extent: contact between PAs and in-work clients may be
often limited to telephone checks on progress.
9.21 New Deal for Disabled People Personal Adviser Service pilot
The NDDP PA Service pilots ran from 1998 to mid 2001 in twelve sites.  PAs
were available to provide in-work support for up to 13 weeks after placement
into a job.  In-work support services appear not to have been well developed
(Loumidis et.el. 2001).  In most instances, calls for help were dependent upon
employers and clients approaching the service, although some PAs developed
systems for checking on client progress at least in the first few weeks of a new
job.  However, most PAs appear not to have developed a systematic system for
monitoring client progress.  This was mainly attributed to pressure of work.
                                                
14  Data based on internal DWP reports.  Please refer to the DWP ASD5L team for further information.
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9.22 Loumidis et.al. (2001) report that PAs also seemed to have varied their
approach to dealing with problems considerably.  Some took the line that the
client was essentially a dependent individual who required as much help as
possible: for example, PAs would mediate the return to work with the employer
on behalf of the benefit leaver.  Other PAs would stress the need to develop the
autonomy of the individual and seek to equip their client with the information
and skills to negotiate, for example, their own return to work.
9.23 New Deal for Disabled People Innovative Schemes pilots
Twenty four NDDP Innovative Scheme pilots ran from 1998 until June of 2001.
These were designed to test a variety of methods for helping disabled clients
into work and providing on-going support.  A number were also designed to
provide job retention services.
9.24 Support into work: many disabled clients were found to be anxious and lacking
in confidence when they started a job (Hills et.al. (2001).  The transition to work
was often mediated by staff employed by a scheme or by a workplace ‘buddy’
or ‘mentor’ who would negotiate with the employer to obtain suitable
adaptations, technical supports, transport and access arrangements etc.  Hills
et.al. (2001: 82) comment that this kind of support was often “vital to the long-
term sustainability of employment”.
9.25 Ongoing support: there was a clear difference of policy between schemes as to
how ongoing support should be provided: some favoured informal
arrangements, whereby the client would be encouraged to contact the scheme
as and when the need arose (Hills et.al. (2001).  Others favoured a formal,
structured arrangement with regular meetings between clients and staff
attached to the schemes.  In both instances, it was intended that support would
be time limited and aimed to encourage increasing client independence, i.e.
clients would be shown how to negotiate their needs with an employer rather
than continue to rely on the scheme.  It is uncertain which approach was more
effective, but in real terms, clients required higher levels of personal support
and help than many schemes had expected.
9.26 Mentors: one scheme trained and supported mentors who were recruited from
within the workplace for each client.  This arrangement was set up before the
client started employment.  Hills et.al. (2001) do not provide a separate
evaluation of the effectiveness of this approach.
9.27 Job retention services: seven of the schemes included job retention services
and for four, it was their prime focus.  Services included: a job brokerage
service – to help obtain better jobs; information and advice on employment law,
benefits; training and re-training; support for clients with specific disabilities;
education of employers about job retention.  The evaluation by Hills et.al. (2001)
is instructive: schemes found that early intervention with clients starting work
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was vital to later success; the independence of scheme staff was important in
promoting action and ensuring that job retention was taken seriously; co-
operation from both employers and employees (i.e. clients) was essential to
making any progress at all.  A number of schemes noted that engaging the
enthusiasm and active support of employees as well as employers was often
very difficult.
It should be noted that further NDDP Job Retention and Rehabilitation Pilots are
planned for the future.
9.28 Services for disabled people: international evidence
Corden & Thornton (forthcoming) have conducted an international review of
post-employment services for disabled people in five countries15.  All projects
have incorporated some element of case management services as part of their
job retention strategy.
9.29 They have found that there was great variation within and between programmes
on the quality and range of services offered.  Most programmes encountered
problems of communication between clients and case managers which lead to
considerable dissatisfaction.  There was some use of assessment and job
plans by managers, but delivery of services tended to be ad hoc and
unsystematic.
9.30 Overall, Corden & Thornton conclude:
• in-work support is a valuable means for integrating disabled workers into
the workplace and equipping them with skills for advancement;
• there is a lack of significant evidence linking types of services available
to effective outcomes for clients;
• it is not possible to identify the kind of person for whom employment
‘rehabilitation’ works best;
• not enough is known of how to target the disabled population for
appropriate employment services.
9.31 They went on to comment: “Evidence from the wider research literature
suggests that the more successful programmes tend to take a holistic and
individualized approach, incorporating basic skills and supports, formal training
and one-to-one support alongside some practical assistance, for example with
transport or child care. . . . . There is also some evidence that supported
employment may be more effective than traditional vocational counselling and
job clubs for people with severe mental illnesses.”
                                                
15  NDDP Personal Adviser Service pilots, UK; Project NetWork, USA; National Vocational Rehabilitation
Project, Canada; Intensive Assistance in the Job Network, Australia; Disability Employment Services in the
Case Based Funding Trial, Australia; Arbeitsassistenz, Austria.
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9.32 New Deal for Lone Parents
Evidence is this section comes from the evaluation of the NDLP PA Service
pilots by Lewis et.al (2000) and follow-up research reported by Lewis (2001).
9.33 The NDLP PA Service pilots were designed to ensure that support to lone
parents would continue in-work once they has started a new job.  Support was
to be provided by NDLP Personal Advisers.  Evidence from Lewis et.al (2000)
indicates that in practical terms, very little support was actually provided by
PAs.  Some PAs appear to have helped lone parents deal with financial
matters and ensure that benefits were available in the transition to work.
Instances were found where PAs had discussed issues with lone parents which
potentially threatened their employment (including employer’s attitudes,
childcare arrangements) and some PAs had contacted employers to discuss a
lone parent’s difficulties with, for example, a sick child.  In general, PAs felt
there was little or nothing they could do beyond advising lone parents to talk to
their employer and provide “moral support” (Hills et.al., 2000:89).
9.34 PAs appeared to have very little conception of a proactive role for themselves
in encouraging employment sustainability.  As a consequence, they did not
promote their services to any great extent, nor did they establish any regular,
systematic contact with lone parents once they were in work.  Moreover,
pressures of their workload tended to discourage them taking an active
approach to in-work support.
9.35 For their part, Lewis et.al. (2000) found that lone parents had little knowledge of
the in-work services available through NDLP and little interest in contacting their
PA.  In a follow-up survey of lone parents that had participated in the NDLP
programme, Lewis (2001) found that parents who had lost a job had not made
use of PAs for in-work support.  Some were embarrassed that they had lost
their job, others did not think the PA could help and many were unaware that in-
work support was available through NDLP.
9.36 In-work advisory support
Before leaving the subject of Personal Advisors, it is worth stressing that a
small number of clients found the period of transition from benefit to work to be
difficult and needed support from their PA in overcoming any initial difficulties
(GHK, 2001).  As the earlier evidence from the NDDP and NDLP pilots
indicates, the PA role needs more development and definition (as has occurred
in the National NDLP programme).  In existing programmes, it can be difficult
for PAs to find time to do this when they are taking on new clients or as the
number of compulsory meetings increases.  Demand for in-work advisory
support is likely to be low, but it could make the difference for a small number in
sustaining their employment.  Clients most likely to need this type of service are
those with health problems who may struggle to meet their work commitments,
38
and lone parents. On NDLP, where in-work support has been provided, some
clients and PAs found it difficult to enforce the 6-8 week expected cut-off point
for in-work contact, particularly if clients lost or changed jobs and wanted to
return to their PA.
9.37 GHK (2001) claim that these findings are supported by evaluation of ES
specialist in-work help and support for the more severely disabled client group.
The most recent evaluation has indicated that early intensive input, followed by
a tapering off and telephone help was successful, although exit strategies for
withdrawing help proved difficult to manage.
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10. Conclusions: bringing the evidence together
10.1 In this section, evidence from across the report will be pulled together to provide
an overview of:
10.1.1 the characteristics of benefit-leavers who are vulnerable to job loss;
10.1.2 the problems faced by benefit-leavers in retaining and advancing in
work;
10.1.3 the kinds of measures or programmes that are successful in keeping
benefit-leavers in work and advancing their careers.
10.2 The characteristics of benefit-leavers who are vulnerable to job loss
In general terms, there is a strong association between the employment history
of a benefit claimant and their ability to retain a job.  Other things being equal, it
appears that those who struggle to find employment tend to be the first to leave
a job.  For example, workers who have had three or more previous spells on
JSA are three times more likely to return to JSA within 3 months in a permanent
job compared to those who have not had a previous spell.
10.3 Occupational status and qualifications are associated with job retention: those
with low or no qualifications and those in blue collar jobs are more likely to
return to benefits within a short space of time.  Data on early returners to JSA
indicate that men are more likely than women to leave a job early and return to
claim benefits16.  There is some evidence that the presence of children over 5
years of age in a household increases the likelihood that a benefit-leaver will
leave a job and return to JSA.  Housing tenure also plays a part: those in social
rented accommodation or living with others are much more likely to make an
early return to JSA.
10.4 Journey to work appears to be a crucial factor: benefit leavers who have a long
journey time, lack a driving licence or have difficulty accessing private transport
are all more likely to leave a job within 3 months.
10.5 Poor health is more complex: those with chronic and multiple health problems
have an increased chance of returning to claim benefits soon after starting a
job.  However, Incapacity Benefit data show that IB claimants who were in
employment before making a claim are more likely to return and stay in
employment.  These findings merely reinforce the point made earlier by Marsh
(2001b) when describing job retention amongst lone parents (see para 4.15);
the point can be applied to all benefit-leavers: what an individual was doing
before they began claiming benefits has a strong bearing upon what happens
when they start a new job.
                                                
16 However, these data do not take account of gender differences of those who leave work for non-JSA
benefits.
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10.6 Problems faced by benefit-leavers in retaining and advancing in work
There is insufficient UK (and US) research about why benefit-leavers leave a
job or fail to advance in work to provide a comprehensive analysis.  However, it
is possible to make some generalizations.
10.7 The Ashworth & Liu (2001) analysis of benefit-leavers returning to JSA
suggests that around half left a permanent job of their own volition: mainly
because they resigned (i.e. the job did not suit them) with about one in ten
leaving for family or health reasons.  The other 50% of reasons were related to
problems (apparently) beyond their control: because they were sacked, made
redundant or the job turned out to be time-limited.
10.8 The Hales et.al. (2000) analysis of lone parents returning to IS from a job
suggests that about two in three left a job voluntarily: again, the majority left
because the job did not suit them, but a minority (about one in eight) quoted “a
relationship breakdown”.  About one fifth left because they lost the job,
presumably because they were sacked.
10.9 We do not have a further analysis of the reasons JSA claimants give for leaving
a job, but additional qualitative work by Lewis (2001) on lone parents suggests
that they leave because the financial transition to work is too costly or
worthwhile; childcare arrangements become problematic; or the job is not right
for them (e.g. too demanding).  There are a further set of reasons which can be
related to the workplace itself: the employer is not sympathetic to their needs or
does not live up to their promises (for example on work hours) or there is lack of
support (even “hostility”) from work colleagues.
10.10 It is possible to group these kinds of reasons for leaving a job into three
categories (though they are not mutually exclusive):
• pre-existing ‘barriers’ to obtaining work that re-emerge as significant
factors in retaining work, e.g. long standing illness;
• new problems that arise in work (e.g. getting into arguments with
supervisors, or failure of an employer to honour agreements on hours);
• new problems that arise in private life.  Many problems may be short-
term crises, e.g. loss of accommodation, relationship break down,
failure of childcare arrangements.
10.11 In many instances, a reason for leaving a job (i.e. the ‘trigger’ that leads to an
individual losing a job) may be very similar, if not identical, to a ‘barrier’ to
obtaining a job.
10.12 The relative importance of these ‘barriers’ is not known in any detail nor is their
significance for individual groups of benefit-leavers.  This is in part due to the
problems of collecting accurate data: benefit-leavers are reluctant to reveal
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information about themselves (to employment service staff or employers) which
is embarrassing or may possibly lead to dismissal from a job.
10.13 Job retention and advancement programmes
In this section, the findings from UK labour market programmes with a job
retention remit will be pulled together and related to findings from the US.
10.14 Post-employment services (stand-alone programmes):
Programmes in the US exclusively devoted to the promotion of job retention
and advancement services have a poor record.  Such programmes have begun
their operations once welfare recipients have started work and this has often
proved to be too late for case-managers to recruit participants easily.
However, once welfare recipients have been recruited, case managers have
usually struggled to cope with their workloads and provide an effective in-work
service to clients.  The clients themselves frequently conceal their welfare
history (and other problems) from their employer.  As a consequence, case
managers have found it difficult to work with employers because of the client’s
fear of being victimized.
10.15 There is no similar UK post-employment evidence to compare with the
experience of the US.
10.16 Financial support programmes
The United States has a long history of providing tax credits for low income
families: evaluation research indicates that their impact can be considerable in
promoting job retention and advancement, although the difference they make
can vary according to the circumstances of recipients, i.e. whether they have a
partner and/or children.   In the UK, Earnings Top-up and Family Credit
attempted to achieve similar benefits for low-income individuals and families in
the 1990s.  There was some evidence that Family Credit made a difference on
retaining jobs (but not advancement), however, ETU had no significant impact
at all on job retention and advancement.
10.17 Financial support may also be available to individuals on a one-off or casual
basis as part of general post-employment services.  Such handouts are
intended to help low wage earners deal with crises and periods of hardship
(and thus help retain jobs).  Separate evaluations of such systems of support
are hard to find, but US research indicates that the timing (i.e. for cash to be
available when needed) and predictability of such payments are critical factors
for success.
10.18 Job retention and advancement schemes which form part of pre-employment
programmes
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There is strong evidence from the United States that the highest job retention
rates can be achieved when post-employment services are incorporated into
pre-employment programmes.  The key findings are:
10.18.1 job retention rates and income advancement will be improved if
welfare recipients are placed initially into the best jobs possible;
10.18.2 job retention rates will be improved if close, systematic support is
provided in the first few months of a job to deal with crises and the
transition to work;
10.18.3 job retention rates will be improved if welfare recipients are
encouraged to develop a job advancement strategy, in effect, to
move clients onto their next job (and better job) as soon as possible.
10.19 There is little in the way of UK evidence to support 10.19.1 and 10.19.3
although the Employment Zones may be able to demonstrate these effects in
time.  There is considerable support for 10.19.2 from the NDDP and NDLP
programmes: the Personal Adviser system has demonstrated that there is a
great deal of value in supporting benefit-leavers in work during the first few
weeks and months of a new job.
10.20 Finally, two separate issues that are crucial aspects of the organization and
management of post-employment services:
• Case management
Despite the fact that the New Deal Personal Adviser system has proved its
worth, the evaluation research shows that PAs have struggled to find the time
and resources to provide close, in-work support.  This echoes the experience of
the United States where case-managers, for example in the PESD programme,
failed to meet their in-work commitments to clients effectively.  Strawn &
Martinson (2001) argue strongly for the development of a service-brokerage
system in which specialist services are provided by third-party organizations –
although they admit that there is little research evidence to support this claim.
There is UK evidence from the NDDP Innovative Scheme pilots to support the
use of service specialists for disabled benefit-leavers in work.
• Working with employers
Perhaps the greatest potential for improving job retention rates lies with
employers themselves: they have, or should have, a keen interest in reducing
staff turnover rates and thus reducing costs.  Of course, many employers
offering low-skill, entry-level jobs may use high turnover to keep wages down.
However, there is a large body of US evidence that the best way to help many
(though not all) benefit-leavers with specific skill deficiencies is to provide
training in the workplace and, crucially, to provide training for supervisors so
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that they can offer appropriate support17.  Hills et.al. (2001) report that there
was considerable positive support amongst employers for the NDDP Innovative
Scheme pilots that developed in-work training schemes for clients and
supervisors.
In the long run, there are sizeable, potential, cost savings (to the public
purse) if employers can take more responsibility for job retention and
advancement issues.  But as the NDDP pilots found, it is not always easy to
involve clients and employers in such projects – for the kinds of reasons
discussed in 12.13 above.  Nevertheless, there are a considerable number of
employers that are committed to equal opportunities and the support of
disabled workers who should, in theory, be sympathetic to such ventures.
                                                
17 There are a number of private sector initiatives of this type in existence in the US and UK.  Information on




Table 1.  The impact of selected demographic and social factors on benefit-
leavers returning to JSA
Previous JSA history
% Return to JSA
within 3 months
from permanent job














Social rent 21% 38%
Private rent 7% 26%
Lives with other 14% 40%
Other 7% 44%
Age
18-24 yrs 13% 35%
25-34 yrs 9% 44%
35-44 yrs 10% 34%




Vocational only 17% 43%
Academic only 11% 35%
Academic and vocational 9% 35%
Driving licence and access to
transport
No licence/access 18% 40%
Licence and access 8% 35%
Health
Problems 21% 47%




Extracted from: Ashworth & Liu, 2001: table 3.5
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Table 2. Benefit-leavers returning to JSA from NDYP




Previous spells on JSA:
One JSA claim 19% 30%
Nine or more JSA claims 83% 95%
Existing qualifications:
NVQ4 27% 35%
No qualifications 50% 62%
Stage of leaving:
Employment Option 30% 45%
FTET course, Vol Sector option, Gateway or
Pre-Gateway
43% 54%
Environment Task Force, Follow Through 58% 71%
Destination on leaving:
Unsubsidized employment 45% 57%
Other benefits 33% 43%





Employment Option 37% 48%
FTET course, Vol Sector options 54% 54%
ETF Option 55% 67%
Age on joining:
18 years old 48% 58%
21 years old 43% 55%




Source: Stickland, 2001: analysis of NDYP database.
49




% Return to JSA
within 3 months
from permanent job
% Return to JSA
within 3 months
from temporary job
Length of most recent JSA spell
1-13 weeks 10% 32%
14-26 weeks 14% 54%
27+ weeks 47% 60%






Managers / administrators 3% 20%
Professionals / associate /
technical
1% 38%
Clerical & secretarial 5% 31%
Craft & related 17% 37%
Personal & protective services 15% 29%
Sales 8% 47%
Plant & machine operators 15% 35%
Other occupations 22% 51%
All 12% 38%
N 562 525
Extracted from: Ashworth & Liu, 2001: table 3.3 and 3.4
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Marital status in 1991:
Never-partnered mothers 93 39%
Separated from marriage 102 32%
Separated from co-habitation 85 32%
Divorced mothers 267 31%
Widowed mothers 16 25%
Lone fathers 38 10%
Housing tenure in 1991
Owner 257 28%
Private renter 24 50%




Black & Asian 35 23%




Two or more 64 39%
Highest qualifications
None 176 40%
Lower school 143 36%
Vocational 97 32%
All other higher qualifications 117 22%
Income support
Received IS in 1991 27 56%
Did not receive IS in 1991 580 31%
Source: Lone Parent Cohort (PRILIF), waves 1991 to 1998
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Out of work Base
Status in 1991
In work 24+ hrs
Individual 78% 8% 3% 11% (334)
100%
Household 86% 5% 2% 7% 100%
Out of work
Individual 18% 15% 8% 58% (244)
100%
Household 32% 10% 7% 50% 100%
All individuals 36% 14% 8% 43% (725)
100%
All households 46% 9% 6% 36% 100%
Source: Lone Parent Cohort (PRILIF), waves 1991 to 1998
Table 6. Initial activity of Incapacity Benefit claimants after leaving IB and
activity at time of postal follow-up, 12 to 18 months later.




loyed Sick Other Working
Unem-
ployed Sick Other
Activity after 12 to 18 months . . . .
Working 72% 30% 7% 7% 79% 56% 49% 23%
Unemployed 3% 23% 5% 8% 4% 15% 0% 5%
Sick 19% 34% 76% 28% 14% 17% 36% 9%
Other 6% 13% 13% 58% 3% 12% 15% 64%
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
N 118 396 412 137 412 76 27 57
Source: Dorsett  et.al. (1998): extracted from table 3.4, p 39.
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Table 7. Activity of Incapacity Benefit claimants prior to IB claim
Disallowed Voluntary All leavers
Employed, not sick 17% 23% 19%
Self-employed 5% 10% 7%
Employed, off sick 49% 51% 50%
Unemployed / Scheme 19% 9% 16%
Sick, not employed 7% 3% 6%
Other, inactive 4% 4% 4%
Total 100% 100% 100%
N 1,456 807 2,263
Source: Dorsett  et.al. (1998): extracted from table 2.10, p 24.






Temporary: ended naturally 6% 65%
Fixed-term expired 5% 9%
Sacked 13% 1%
Made redundant 14% 3%
Resigned 40% 14%
Family / personal 1% 2%
Health 8% 4%




Extracted from: Ashworth & Liu, 2001, table 3.2
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Table 9. Health impairments of Incapacity Benefit Claimants at start of claim
Impairment Main impairment
Musculo-skeletal 47%
Problems with arms or hands 10%
Problems with legs or feet 14%




Heart, blood pressure, circulation 7%
Mental 18%
Depression, nerves, anxiety 14%
Neurological 1%
Other 8%
Multiple (no main condition) 8%
Total 100%
N 2,246
Source: Dorsett  et.al. (1998): extracted from table 2.12, p 26.
Table 10. How paid work was affected by health on leaving IB
Problem Column %,
multiple response
Difficulty with heavy physical work 76%
Take time off because of sickness 63%
Restrict number of hours worked 61%
Affect productivity 54%
Difficulty in travelling to work 33%





Source: Dorsett et.al. (1998): extracted from table 2.17, p 31.
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Respondent left job 30% 40%
Respondent lost job 27% 21%
Relationship breakdown 11% 12%
Had less money off IS than when claiming
it
4% 3%
Received less money off IS than expected 0% 4%
Respondent reduced hours worked 0% 3%
Partner’s job ended 2% 0%
Other 27% 17%
Total 100% 100%
Weighted base 46 55
Unweighted base 53 67
Source: Hales et.al. (2000): extracted from table 9.4.17, p 234











Substance abuse 5% to 60% 9.5%
Domestic violence (current / recent) 15% to 34% 1.5%
Domestic violence (at sometime in life) 29% to 65% 25%
Physical disability or chronic health problems 10% to 31% 11%
Mental health, depression, other problems 2% to 39% 20%
Criminal records 46% 5%
Very low basic skills or learning difficulties 10% to 66% 21%
Language barriers 7% to 20% 5%
Source: Brown, 2001: 9.
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Table 13. Estimated impact of EITC, California Work Pays Demonstration
Programme and growth of California economy on employment change,
1993-98.











AFDC single parent: 1
child
+13 points 21% 23% 56%
AFDC single parent: 2 or
more children
+19 points 45% 16% 39%
AFDC unemployed parent:
1 child
+18 points 15% 17% 68%
AFDC unemployed parent:
2 or more children
+27 points 32% 11% 57%
Source: extracted from Hotz et.al. 2001: 34-36.
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